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301 
HEREIN OF “HEREIN GRANTED”: WHY 
ARTICLE I’S VESTING CLAUSE DOES  




Article I of the United States Constitution begins as follows: 
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States[.]”1 That text is sometimes called 
the Vesting Clause,2 or, more precisely, the Article I Vesting 
Clause, because Articles II and III also begin with Vesting 
Clauses.3 And there is a feature of those three clauses, when 
compared, to which twenty-first century constitutional lawyers 
commonly attribute considerable significance. Although the three 
Clauses are similar in other ways, the syntax of Article I’s Vesting 
Clause is not fully parallel to that of the other two. The Vesting 
Clauses of Articles II and III say, respectively, that “The 
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States 
of America”4 and “The judicial Power of the United States, shall 
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
 
 * Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor, The University of Michigan Law 
School. I thank Cade Boland, Ruby Emberling, Jonathan Gienapp, Kaley Hanenkrat, 
John Mikhail, Julian Mortenson, Virginia Neisler, William Treanor, Adam Wallstein, 
Audrey Springer-Wilson, and the participants in the 2019 University of Wisconsin Law 
School Constitutional Law Schmooze, organized by David Schwartz. Research for this 
Article was funded in part by the Cook Endowment at the University of Michigan Law 
School. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 2. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1729 (2002) (using this nomenclature). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
 4. Id. art. II, § 1. 
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Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”5 They do 
not say that the President and the courts exercise the executive 
and judicial powers “herein granted.” 
Working from the intuition that that difference in language 
must be meaningful, several leading professors of constitutional 
law have adopted what I will call the enumerationist reading of 
Article I’s Vesting Clause.6 According to the enumerationist 
reading, it matters that Article I’s Vesting Clause speaks of 
powers “herein granted” rather than saying, in parallel with the 
other clauses, something like “The legislative power shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States.” To say “The legislative 
power shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,” this line 
of thinking runs, would be to say that Congress enjoys legislative 
power in general. To say instead that Congress is invested with 
the “legislative powers herein granted,” the argument continues, 
is to say that the legislative power granted to Congress is limited 
in a way that the executive and judicial powers granted to the 
other branches are not. Rather than exercising general legislative 
power, Congress is entitled to exercise only those legislative 
powers herein granted—that is, in the enumerationist 
understanding, those powers affirmatively specified in the text of 
the Constitution.7 
A recent formulation of the point by Lawrence Lessig is 
illustrative: 
 
 5. Id. art. III, § 1. 
 6. For a methodologically and politically diverse sample, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 75 (2019); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789 
(3d ed. 2000) (“Article I, § 1 endows Congress not with ‘all legislative power,’ but only with 
the ‘legislative Powers herein granted.’”); Randy E. Barnett, The Continuing Relevance of 
the Original Meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2017); 
Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of 
Executive Power, 106 CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 (2018); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing 
the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1894 (2005). 
 7. This enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause goes beyond what might be 
called the partial-power reading. On the partial-power reading, the fact that Article I, 
Section 1 speaks of “legislative powers,” plural, rather than “legislative power”—the latter 
of which would be parallel to the language of Articles II and III—signals that Congress is 
vested with something less than plenary legislative jurisdiction. But that proposition alone 
does not entail the further proposition that the legislative jurisdiction with which Congress 
is vested is limited to the specific grants affirmed in the Constitution’s text. It is the words 
“herein granted” that are commonly said to establish the latter proposition (and, thus, to 
reinforce the first one). The enumerationist reading takes the clause to establish both 
points. 
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[T]he federal government, unlike state governments, has only 
the powers that are delegated to it by the Constitution. The 
Framers made this idea explicitly clear in Article I, where they 
wrote, “Congress has the powers herein granted.” “Herein 
granted”—not any power you might imagine a government to 
have; just those powers specified in the Constitution.8 
Note that in Lessig’s presentation, the principle that 
Congress may exercise only the specific powers mentioned in the 
Constitution is not an inference from the text of the Vesting 
Clause. It is the plain meaning of the text: the language makes the 
point “explicitly clear.”9 
But it doesn’t. It doesn’t even come close. 
This Article explains why the Vesting Clause of Article I does 
not establish, or even support, the idea that Congress may 
exercise only its constitutionally enumerated powers. To be sure, 
that idea—for ease of reference, the enumeration principle—
might be correct even if the Vesting Clause lends it no support. 
The enumeration principle might rest instead on the text of the 
Tenth Amendment,10 or the architecture of Article I, Section 8,11 
or a proposition about federalism,12 or a traditional understanding 
going back to the Founding.13 As it happens, and for reasons I 
have explained elsewhere, those other possible bases for the 
enumeration principle are also much weaker than commonly 
recognized.14 The project of this paper, however, is not to 
 
 8. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 75. 
 9. Id. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to 
Resolve Collective Action Problems under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
2123 (2012) (arguing that the fact that Section 8 is written as a list of particular powers 
indicates that Congress does not have general legislative power). 
 12. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225 (2011) (“[A]ction that exceeds 
the National Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of 
States.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 535 (2012) (opinion 
of Roberts, C.J.) (offering the traditional account on which the Framers wrote a 
Constitution without a Bill of Rights because they trusted the enumeration of 
congressional powers to do the work of limiting government). 
 14. See generally Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 
(2014) (challenging structural, historical and textual rationales for the enumeration 
principle); Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2016) 
(offering an alternative account of the function that the enumeration principle plays in 
constitutional culture); Richard Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 567 
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challenge the enumeration principle as a whole. It is to attack, 
frontally and thoroughly, one of the supports on which that 
principle is said to rest. If the attack succeeds, perhaps readers will 
be more willing to consider the possibility that the enumeration 
principle’s other supposed foundations are vulnerable as well. But 
even if readers are not inclined to doubt the enumeration 
principle more broadly, constitutional lawyers should not go 
around saying that the Vesting Clause establishes that principle. 
Because it does not. 
In Part I of this Article, I expose problems with the 
enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting Clause. Then, in 
Parts II and III, I offer better ways of understanding that Clause. 
In Part II, I show that if the nonparallel phrasing of the 
Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses is to be given substantive 
legal significance, it makes more sense to read Article I’s Vesting 
Clause as a statement that legislative power is vested solely in 
Congress than as a statement that Congress is limited to powers 
specifically enumerated. In Part III, I suggest that a yet better way 
to read the three Vesting Clauses is to accept that their 
nonparallel phrasing might not have any legal significance. 
Two preliminary points are in order before proceeding 
further. First, the contrast between the language of Article I’s 
Vesting Clause and that of Article II is commonly offered in 
support of two different propositions. One is that Congress can 
act only on the basis of specifically enumerated powers. The other 
is that the President, whose Vesting Clause does not speak of 
powers “herein granted,” enjoys general executive power rather 
than just a collection of specific textual authorizations.15 My focus 
 
(2017) (explaining that Chief Justice John Marshall’s dictum in Gibbons v. Ogden that 
“[t]he enumeration presupposed something not enumerated” was not an endorsement of 
the enumeration principle); Richard Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”: Enumerated 
Powers and the Bank of the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018) (showing the 
contested status of the enumeration principle at the time of the First Congress); Richard 
Primus & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers: A Guide to 
Leaving the Lamppost, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (explaining why it does not make 
sense to think that Article I’s enumeration of congressional powers is a device for limiting 
federal legislative jurisdiction). 
 15. This view can encompass both what Julian Davis Mortenson calls the “law 
execution” theory of Article II, Section 1 (according to which the Article II Vesting Clause 
confers a general but substantive power to execute the law) and what Mortenson calls the 
“royal residuum” theory (according to which the Article II Vesting Clause confers a set of 
substantive powers once associated with the British Monarch, including such foreign 
affairs and war powers as are not expressly allocated to Congress). See Julian Davis 
Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. 
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in this Article is on the first of those propositions. But if I am right 
that Article I’s Vesting Clause does not indicate that Congress is 
limited to a set of textually enumerated powers, then the contrast 
between the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II does not support 
the claim that Article II vests general executive power in the 
President either. It might still be the case that the President should 
be understood to enjoy general executive power, but the 
contrasting language of the Vesting Clauses would not be a reason 
why.16 
Second, the prominence of arguments based on the non-
parallel phrasing of the Vesting Clauses seems to be a relatively 
recent phenomenon, dating more or less from the 1990s. Not that 
such arguments were completely novel at that time: as scholars of 
presidential power know, Alexander Hamilton used the contrast 
to defend President Washington’s 1793 neutrality proclamation 
against the charge that the President had only those powers 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution.17 But Hamilton’s 
argument seems to have been the product of post-ratification 
creativity, rather than the articulation of a generally shared 
understanding. As I will show below, the idea that Article I’s 
Vesting Clause limits Congress to a set of textually enumerated 
powers was virtually unknown in the ratification debates of 1787–
88.18 It was also absent from the First Congress, and conspicuously 
so. The First Congress prominently featured conflict over the 
question of whether Congress was limited to powers specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution: think, for example, of the fight 
over chartering the Bank of the United States. The 
Representatives arguing for the enumerationist position in those 
debates had every incentive to point to the Vesting Clauses for 
support, if they thought the Vesting Clauses supported their view. 
None of them did, which suggests that none of them thought 
Article I’s Vesting Clause established the enumeration principle.19 
So Hamilton’s 1793 argument indicates that it was possible for a 
smart lawyer in the Early Republic to hit upon this reading, but it 
 
L. REV. 1169, 1180–83 (2019). 
 16. For further discussion of the Article II issue, see Julian Davis Mortenson, The 
Executive Power Clause, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1269 (2020). 
 17. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 33–43 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969); see infra Part 
I.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.A.4. 
 19. See infra Part I.A.4. 
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does not seem to have been an intuitive reading for the rest of the 
Founding generation. 
Nor did American lawyers make contrasting the Vesting 
Clauses into a staple feature of constitutional argument after 
Hamilton showed them the way. A generation after Hamilton, 
Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States devoted roughly three thousand words to a chapter 
on Article I’s Vesting Clause and at no point even hinted at the 
possibility that its text might bear on the scope of the powers 
vested in Congress,20 and his discussions of the other Vesting 
Clauses include no mention of their being differently phrased.21 I 
am aware of only one case in the Constitution’s first two centuries 
in which a federal court read Article I’s Vesting Clause to support 
the idea that Congress can exercise only a set of textually 
enumerated powers.22 And in the law-review literature, it is hard 
to locate arguments from the non-parallel phrasing of the Vesting 
Clauses prior to the 1990s.23 None of this means that the idea was 
ever wholly forgotten or affirmatively rejected.24 But it does not 
 
 20. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 269–88, at 199–209 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. abr. ed., 1833). For Story, the 
thing worth discussing about the Vesting Clause was the bicameral nature of Congress. Id. 
 21. Id. §§ 720–65, at 515–45 (discussing Article II, Section 1); id. § 823, at 585, § 826, 
at 587–89 (discussing Article III, Section 1). 
 22. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81 (1907). Similarly, I am aware of only two 
cases in which federal courts have read the contrast between the first two Vesting Clauses 
to support Hamilton’s reading of Article II. They are Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
137–39 (1926) (citing Hamilton on executive power) and Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 
704 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). To be clear, these are not the only two 
instances in which federal courts have grappled with the possibility that the Vesting Clause 
of Article II is a substantive grant of general executive power. They are merely the only 
occasions (to my knowledge) on which the contrast between the language of Article II’s 
Vesting Clause and that of Article I has been presented as a reason to interpret either 
Vesting Clause in a particular way. 
 23. A 1988 article by David Currie seems to countenance the argument, but only in 
passing and in a footnote. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 
1946–1953, 37 EMORY L.J. 249, 289 n.240 (1988) (citing Hamilton). 
 24. Clinton Rossiter’s 1961 edition of the Federalist Papers is probably best read to 
suggest an endorsement of the enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting Clause, but it 
takes a bit of digging to see it. Rossiter printed the text of the Constitution at the back of 
his book. Next to the Constitution’s text, he included, as a sort of index, the page number 
or numbers of the book on which Publius discussed the relevant constitutional language. 
Using this system, Rossiter indexed the words “All legislative Powers herein granted” to 
the portion of Federalist 45 where Madison described the powers of the national 
government as “few and defined.” See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 529 (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). It seems fair to infer that Rossiter took the language of Article I, Section 1 to 
establish that Congress could exercise only a small number of specifically enumerated 
powers. But what the casual reader of Rossiter’s index might not notice is that Federalist 
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seem to have been commonly held either. 
Things seem to have changed at roughly the same time that 
the Rehnquist Court was handing down landmark decisions like 
New York v. United States25 and United States v. Lopez.26 In 1994, 
in a Harvard Law Review article characterizing the entire modern 
administrative state as unconstitutional, Gary Lawson read the 
“herein granted” language of Article I, Section 1 to establish the 
enumerationist interpretation of that Vesting Clause.27 The 
following April, Laurence Tribe offered the enumerationist 
reading in another Harvard Law Review article,28 and Justice 
Clarence Thomas made the same move in his Lopez 
concurrence.29 Many others have adopted that reading in the 
quarter century since.30 
But it was not always thus. For most of American history, the 
language of Article I’s Vesting Clause was not standardly given 
the enumerationist reading. Nor should it have been. The idea 
that Article I’s Vesting Clause restricts Congress to a set of 
 
45 nowhere quotes or mentions Article I, Section 1. (None of the Federalist Papers does.) 
The association between that Clause and the idea of a Congress whose powers are “few 
and defined” seems to be Rossiter’s rather than Madison’s. 
 25. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot commandeer state 
legislatures). 
 26. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding, for the first time since 1937, that a piece of federal 
legislation exceeded Congress’s legislative powers). 
 27. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231, 1233–34 (1994). Lawson’s article was published shortly after a set of authors 
endorsing robust presidential power revived Hamilton’s 1793 point and adduced the 
contrast between the first two Vesting Clauses as evidence for their approach to Article II. 
See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1175–76 (1992); Saikrishna Bangalore 
Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s 
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 997 (1993). 
 28. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1269 (1995). 
 29. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 592 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas 
has repeated the move more than once since Lopez, but always in separate opinions. See 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2097–98 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Comstock, 560 
U.S. 126, 160 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 30. See supra note 6. In caselaw rather than academic commentary, I am aware of 
only a few decisions clearly endorsing the enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting 
Clause. See United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 2002): United States v. 
Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Ho); United States v. Volungus, 599 F. 
Supp. 2d 68, 71 n.2 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing TRIBE, supra note 6), rev’d, 595 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2010). As noted above, Justice Thomas has offered the enumerationist reading in several 
separate opinions, but to my knowledge no Supreme Court majority has endorsed that 
interpretation since Kansas v. Colorado in 1907. 
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textually enumerated powers cannot withstand careful scrutiny. 
I. THE ENUMERATIONIST READING 
According to the enumerationist reading of the Vesting 
Clause, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States” means that Congress can exercise 
only a specific subset of all legislative powers—those “herein 
granted”—rather than legislative power in general. In this Part, I 
show that this reading departs from the most straightforward 
meaning of the Clause’s language and is in tension with the 
prevailing Founding understanding of constitutional structure. 
Prior to Hamilton’s innovative argument in 1793, the idea that 
Article I’s Vesting Clause limited Congress to a set of textually 
enumerated powers was essentially unknown. In other words, 
Americans at the time of the Constitution’s ratification do not 
seem to have thought that Article I’s Vesting Clause had the 
distinctive meaning that the enumerationist reading gives it, and 
for good reason. 
A. PROBLEMS 
1. All and Only 
The threshold problem with the enumerationist reading is a 
matter of the ordinary-language meaning of the Vesting Clause’s 
text. The enumerationist reading proceeds as if the Vesting 
Clause said “Only the legislative powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States.” If the Clause were 
worded that way, then it would indeed say, at least as a matter of 
ordinary language, that Congress can exercise no legislative 
powers except those granted “herein.” But the word “only” does 
not appear in the Vesting Clause. Article I, Section 1 says that 
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States[.]” Not “only.” 
If the terms “all” and “only” are given their normal 
meanings, granting an institution all powers of a certain kind is 
not the same as granting it only those powers. Consider some 
ordinary-language analogies. “All men are mortal” does not mean 
that only men are mortal. More prosaically, if only my green socks 
are in the laundry, then my blue socks are not in the laundry. But 
if all my green socks are in the laundry, some of my blue socks 
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might be there too. To come closer to the point, “All Bills for 
raising Revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives”31 does not mean that the House is powerless to 
originate other kinds of bills. By the same token, Congress can be 
invested with all legislative powers of a given kind—those “herein 
granted”—and also be invested with other legislative powers.32 
One should not overstate this point. The fact that the 
ordinary-language meanings of “all” and “only” function as 
described above does not mean that no text could use the word 
“all” to convey the restrictive meaning that “only” usually 
conveys. Language is more complicated than that. The meaning 
of a text is often different from the sum of the (literal, generally 
prevailing) meanings of the words it contains, taken one by one. 
And it is possible to identify uses of “all” and “only” that do not 
conform to the pattern I illustrated above. The phrase “all right” 
does not reliably signal that everything is as it should be, and E. M. 
Forster’s injunction “Only connect!”33 did not mean that 
connecting was the sole thing that people ought to do. So it is not 
impossible that a text using the word “all” could be properly read 
to mean the same thing that it would mean if the word “only” were 
used instead, if circumstances of context and audience 
understanding conspired to that end. And for many supporters of 
the enumerationist reading, the contrasting wording of the 
Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses is just such a circumstance. 
But an argument that a constitutional clause should be given 
a non-ordinary-language meaning should acknowledge the gap 
between the proffered meaning and the one that ordinary 
language would produce. The audience for the argument can then 
assess whether the reasons given in favor of the proffered 
meaning are strong enough to overcome whatever presumption 
exists in favor of ordinary language. And as it happens, 
proponents of the enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting 
Clause do not usually argue that the Vesting Clause establishes 
the enumeration principle even though the most straightforward 
reading of its text says something else. On the contrary, they seem 
not to notice that the Clause has an ordinary-language meaning 
different from the one they favor. Some leading proponents of the 
 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
 32. See John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, 
Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1081 (2015). 
 33. E.M. FORSTER, HOWARDS END 188 (1910). 
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enumerationist reading even contend that the enumeration 
principle simply follows from the text of the Vesting Clause: in 
Lessig’s formulation, that the text of the Clause makes the 
principle “explicitly clear.”34 Needless to say, it doesn’t. As a 
matter of ordinary language, the text of the Clause does not 
establish the enumeration principle. It doesn’t even suggest it. 
To be sure, the Vesting Clause does not establish that 
Congress has powers beyond those specifically enumerated. 
Taken in isolation, an ordinary-language understanding of the 
text is consistent with Congress’s having “all legislative powers 
herein granted” as well as some other powers, and it is also 
consistent with Congress’s having “all legislative powers herein 
granted” but none others. That the text is consistent with either 
possibility is precisely the point. Despite the widespread 
acceptance of the enumerationist reading, the text of Section 1 
does not say that Congress is limited to powers “herein granted.” 
The possibility of limitation is not addressed at all. 
2. Where is “Herein”? 
So far, the analysis has assumed, as the enumerationist 
reading does, that “herein granted” in Article I means “granted 
in this document.” But it is worth pausing for a moment to note 
two other possibilities. The first is that “herein granted” means 
“granted in this Article,” not “granted in this document.” The 
second is that “herein granted” means—or at least meant, in 
1787—not “granted in this document” but “granted in this system 
of government.” If either of those alternatives is correct, the 
enumerationist reading cannot be right. 
Consider first the possibility that “herein granted” means 
“granted in Article I.” As a matter of textual interpretation, there 
is no reason why reading the language that way is less compelling 
than reading it to mean “granted anywhere in this document.” 
“Herein” lacks resolving power as between those options. The 
word appears at the very beginning of Article I, which is a natural 
place for a statement about things that will happen in Article I 
particularly. On the other side of the question, one might argue 
that the text also appears at the beginning of the whole document, 
which is a natural place for a statement about things that will 
happen in the whole document. But that response is less than 
 
 34. See LESSIG, supra notes 6 and 8 and accompanying text. 
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clean, because Article I’s Vesting Clause does not, in fact, appear 
at the beginning of the whole document. The Preamble does. The 
language of the Preamble is reasonably understood as intended to 
give the reader a frame for understanding the entire document in 
a way that the language in a particular Article—even Article I, 
Section 1—might not. 
I do not think that this Preamble problem, or anything else, 
dispositively proves that “herein granted” must mean “granted in 
Article I” rather than “granted in this document as a whole.”35 But 
“granted in Article I” is certainly a plausible reading—perhaps 
even a marginally more plausible one, considered solely as a 
textual matter. So without purporting to have shown that 
“granted in this document as a whole” is an incorrect reading, I 
suggest that the existence of this alternative should at least create 
uncertainty. 
The significance of that uncertainty is straightforward. If “All 
legislative Powers herein granted” means “All legislative powers 
granted in Article I,” then the Vesting Clause would not bespeak 
a limitation on the legislative powers of Congress, even if “all” 
were read to mean “only.” Congress obviously has legislative 
powers granted outside of Article I. Consider the power to 
declare the punishment of treason, which is granted in Article 
III,36 or the power to legislate for the federal territories, which is 
granted in Article IV,37 not to mention all the powers granted in 
the enforcement clauses of later constitutional Amendments.38 So 
if “All legislative Powers herein granted” means “All legislative 
powers granted in Article I,” the Vesting Clause cannot mean 
“Congress is vested with the powers herein granted and no 
others.” 
For some readers, that consequence will simply be a reason 
to reject the possibility that “herein granted” means “granted in 
Article I.” The more confident one is that the enumerationist 
reading is correct, the more it will make intuitive sense to give the 
words of the Vesting Clause a meaning that will support that 
reading, rather than one that will undermine it. But note that what 
 
 35. A third possibility—that it means “granted in this Section”—can be safely 
rejected on the grounds that the text of the Section in question specifies no particular 
powers of Congress. 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
 37. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 38. See, e.g., id. amend. XVI (power to levy income taxes). 
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is doing the work when such a reader rejects the possibility that 
“herein” means “in Article I” is not the text of the Clause. It is a 
preexisting conviction about what the Clause must mean. If, 
instead, one asked what the Clause might mean by consulting its 
text, the correctness of the enumerationist reading would not be 
at all clear. 
Next, consider a different kind of alternative—one that rests 
not on the common-sense meaning of the words of the Clause to 
a twenty-first-century reader but on a feature of American 
constitutional thought in 1787–88. Then as now, the term 
“constitution” might refer not to a specific document but to a 
system of government, one within which a document like the one 
we call “the Constitution” might or might not play a role.39 One 
can accordingly speak of the “American constitution” as a mostly 
stable but somewhat fluid system of institutions and practices and 
documents and understandings, on the model of the British 
constitution the Founders knew, rather than as a single specified 
document.40 That much is well understood. Regardless of what 
legal consequences they think might or might not follow from the 
conceptual point, many modern constitutional theorists are 
comfortable talking about these two kinds of constitutions—
sometimes called the big-C Constitution, meaning the document 
with the proper name, and the small-c constitution, which is the 
broader system. But most of the time, theorists who speak of these 
two C/constitutions see them as just that: two different entities, 
each reflecting a different sense of the term that names them 
both.41 
That sense of a clear distinction between the document and 
the system has not always been so solid. As Jonathan Gienapp has 
explained at length, many Americans in 1787–88 drew no sharp 
 
 39. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1890); Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1079 (2013); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). In saying that a 
constitution can be a system of government, I do not mean to deny that things other than 
governments also have constitutions, in the relevant sense of the term. But the present 
discussion is about the governmental kind. 
 40. See, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1934). 
 41. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1984) (arguing for the importance of distinguishing between those portions of 
constitutional law that are textual and those that are not); Ernest A. Young, The 
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007) (recognizing both kinds 
and sharply distinguishing between the two). 
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distinction between the document and the constitution’s other 
components.42 All of it—the document, the traditional practices, 
the background assumptions and shared understandings—was 
just “the constitution.” In Gienapp’s telling, the idea of the 
written Constitution as a more fully differentiated entity—not 
necessarily the exclusive source of constitutional authority, but at 
least a distinct unit of analysis—gained prominence in the 1790s.43 
But in 1787–88, it was not the prevailing conception. (The modern 
convention of using “Constitution” to refer to the document and 
“constitution” to refer to the broader system was accordingly not 
in use at the Founding, not only because eighteenth-century 
capitalization conventions were different, but also because 
Americans then might have felt less need for a way to make the 
distinction.) 
So when the Framers wrote in the Preamble that they were 
ordaining and establishing “this Constitution,” Gienapp suggests, 
they meant to be ordaining and establishing something broader 
than the document in which those words appeared. They meant 
that they were ordaining and establishing a constitution in the 
broader, more fluid, systemic sense.44 The promulgation of the 
document was, within that way of thinking, an act announcing a 
new constitution, but the constitution so announced was not 
limited to the document. It was the broader thing. Just as Article 
II or Article IV was not the entire constitution, neither was the 
document as a whole. 
For the purposes of the present inquiry into the Vesting 
Clause, the significance of Gienapp’s point is that the Framers 
might have understood “herein granted” to mean “granted in this 
constitutional system,” not “granted in this document.”45 The 
domain of “herein,” after all, depends on the unit of analysis that 
is used to delimit the scope of “here.” “Herein” in a document 
organized like the Constitution is organized could mean “in this 
Clause,” “in this Section,” “in the Article,” “in this document,” 
and perhaps other things as well, with the best reading dependent 
 
 42. See JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018). 
 43. E.g., id. at 197–200, 330–32. 
 44. See Jonathan Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given: Enumeration and 
National Power at the Founding, 69 AM. U. L. REV. F. 183 (2020); Jonathan Gienapp, The 
Unfounded Originalist Constitution, 39 L. & HIST. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2021) (on file 
with author). 
 45. See supra note 44. 
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on the broader context. (We know that “herein” in Article I, 
Section 1 does not mean “in this Section” not because the word 
could not bear that meaning but because if it did, the “powers 
herein granted” would be an empty set.) Gienapp’s analysis 
indicates that the list of increasingly broad possible meanings of 
“herein” does not end at “in this document,” because for the 
Framers the document was not sharply differentiated from the 
rest of the constitution. 
Put differently: the reason why it is intuitive to modern 
readers that “herein granted” means “granted in this document” 
is that our intuitive answer to the question “Where do those words 
appear?” is “in the Constitution,” by which we mean neither more 
nor less than “in the document.” But an American in 1787–88 who 
said “those words appear in the C/constitution” could easily have 
meant that those words were part of the larger system. If the 
document is not separate from the rest of the constitution, then it 
is perfectly natural to think that when the document says any 
particular thing, it need not be significant that it’s the document 
talking. What’s talking is the constitution. And if the constitution 
speaks of powers “herein granted,” it is speaking of powers 
granted in the constitution, which is something broader than the 
document. 
Within the Founding-era conceptual scheme that Gienapp 
identifies, the enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause 
makes little sense. After all, the enumerationist reading requires 
the “legislative powers herein granted” to be limited to legislative 
powers specified in the text. If the “legislative powers herein 
granted” can include legislative powers that are vested in 
Congress by virtue of nontextual aspects of the constitution—say, 
by virtue of the sheer fact that Congress was the national 
legislature46 or by virtue of the fact that no other institution within 
the system could fulfill a needed function47—then the text of the 
 
 46. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the 
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 100 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) (describing certain powers 
as “resulting” to Congress in this way); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1955 (1791) (statement of 
Rep. Vining) (arguing that Congress could exercise certain powers simply by virtue of its 
being the legislature of an independent nation); id. at 1905 (statement of Rep. Ames) 
(same). 
 47. See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1955 (1791) (statement of Rep. Vining); id. at 1929 
(statement of Rep. Smith). See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“[I]t is 
not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘a power which must 
belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government’ is not to be found.” 
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Vesting Clause does not limit Congress to any set of textually 
enumerated powers. That text could still indicate that Congress is 
vested only with those powers resulting to it from some specific 
feature of the constitutional system, of course—or at least, it could 
so indicate if “all” were read to mean “only,” in the way described 
above. But the core claim of the enumerationist reading is that 
Congress is restricted to powers affirmatively specified in the 
written Constitution. If “herein granted” means something 
broader than “granted in this document,” that reading falls apart. 
3. Congress Might Have Nonlegislative Powers 
The foregoing difficulties with the enumerationist reading 
are matters of close textual reading. Next, consider an important 
problem that is a matter of constitutional structure. The problem, 
in short, is that the enumerationist reading only makes sense if all 
of Congress’s powers are legislative. The point of the 
enumerationist reading, after all, is to establish that Congress can 
only do things that the text specifies. It reads the Vesting Clause 
to limit Congress’s “legislative powers” to a certain set, and it 
makes the assumption that limiting Congress’s legislative powers 
is the same thing as limiting Congress. But if Congress has 
nonlegislative powers as well as legislative ones, then a principle 
limiting Congress’s legislative powers would not function as a 
general limit on congressional power. Congress could still have 
other powers, including powers not textually enumerated, so long 
as those powers are not legislative powers. 
Modern readers tend to overlook this possibility. The 
dominant tendency today is to regard the powers exercised by 
Congress—which we call “the legislative branch”—as “legislative 
powers,” and the powers exercised by the President as “executive 
powers,” and the powers exercised by the courts as “judicial 
powers.” But that way of thinking flattens out what is better 
understood as—and what the Founders clearly understood as—a 
more complex system.48 
 
(quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903))). 
 48. On Founding-era recognition of this complexity, see, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, 
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 57, 151, 286, 365 
(2010). See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 554 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of 
Rep. Jackson) (“Are the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers kept separate and 
distinct [under the new Constitution]? No, Mr. Chairman, they are blended; not, to be sure, 
in so high or dangerous a degree, but in all the possible forms they are capable of receiving; 
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The power to impeach and remove government officers, for 
example, is not legislative in any substantive sense, even if 
undertaken by a body that we think of as the “legislature.” The 
impeachment process is a matter of prosecuting and adjudicating 
the case of a single individual—that is, an exercise of powers that 
are executive and judicial in nature—rather than a process of 
lawmaking.49 The Senate’s role in the appointment process is also 
not a lawmaking role.50 Congress’s power to lay taxes51 seems 
unproblematically legislative, but its textually specified power to 
collect taxes52 might be better understood as executive.53 
Congress’s power to call conventions for considering 
constitutional amendments on the application of the state 
legislatures54 is at least as plausibly executive as legislative: the 
decision to hold a convention belongs to the state legislatures, and 
Congress is tasked merely with making it happen. 
Given the malleability of the category, “legislative power,” 
some of these characterizations are surely contestable.55 It is not 
my view that any judgment about these contestable claims is as 
good as any other. All things considered, I think the idea that all 
 
the Executive has a qualified check upon the Legislature; the Legislature exercises the 
powers of the Judiciary and Executive.”). 
 49. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463–64 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement 
of Rep. Madison) (describing the Senate’s power to try impeachments as judicial). 
 50. See, e.g., Richard Henry Lee’s Proposed Amendments (Sept. 27, 1787), in 1 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337, 338–39 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter 1 DHRC] (characterizing the Senate’s power of 
appointments as executive); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 496 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) 
(statement of Rep. Madison) (same). 
 51. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
 52. Id. 
 53. In 1783, when the Confederation Congress considered a report on the proposed 
impost, some members of Congress argued that the word “levy” in the report should be 
changed to “collect.” Their reason was “that the first word imported a legislative idea, & 
the latter an executive only, and consequently the latter might be less obnoxious to the 
States.” See 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 945–46 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) [https://perma.cc/73R3-EV4W]. The motion to alter the wording 
was defeated, but not on the ground that “levy” and “collect” lacked the different senses 
that proponents of the change identified. Opponents of the change seem to have raised the 
possibility that nothing would turn on the difference in wording but to have rested more 
heavily on the view that the word choice was significant and that “levy” was the more 
appropriate term. See id. 
 54. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 55. Indeed, as the discussion below highlights, the proposition “the Constitution 
gives Congress non-legislative powers” depends on contestable claims about not just the 
meaning of “legislative powers” but also about the meaning of “Congress.” (The same is 
true for the proposition “the Constitution does not give Congress any non-legislative 
powers.”). 
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of Congress’s powers are legislative in nature is either hard to 
sustain or else devoid of meaningful content. I recognize, 
however, that my view rests in part on an exercise of judgment 
and that some reasonable people will judge differently. As a 
result, the conclusion to this piece of the analysis is perhaps best 
stated in conditional form: if in the end it makes sense to say that 
the Constitution confers at least one nonlegislative power on 
Congress, then it cannot make sense to say that Congress can 
exercise no powers except the “legislative powers herein 
granted.” After all, it would then be the case that Congress is 
entitled to exercise powers that are not legislative at all. 
As a prescriptive matter, one might think that a system of 
government ought to prevent any institution from exercising more 
than one of these kinds of power. On the basis of examples 
including some of those given above, many Antifederalists during 
the ratification debates criticized the Constitution as violating the 
separation-of-powers principle, because it jumbled powers and 
branches rather than confining each branch of government (“the 
legislature,” “the executive”) to the exercise of powers bearing 
the cognate name (“legislative power,” “executive power”). For 
example, Richard Henry Lee argued in September 1787 that the 
proposed Constitution improperly vested an executive power in 
the legislative branch by authorizing the Senate to confirm 
presidential appointments.56 Responding to such criticisms, 
Madison argued that a judicious mixture of the powers was 
consistent with the separation-of-powers idea, which at bottom 
required not that an institution could never be vested with more 
than one kind of power but that each branch should have the 
ability to check and balance the others.57 But the fact that the 
 
 56. See 1 DHRC, supra note 50, at 338. Lee proposed to solve this problem by 
assigning the confirmation power to a privy council lodged entirely within the executive 
branch. Id. For other examples, see MAIER, supra note 48, at 151, 286. 
 57. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“One of the principal 
objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its 
supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
departments ought to be separate and distinct. . . . I persuade myself, however, that it will 
be made apparent to every one. that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim 
on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. . . . [The true principle is 
not] that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts 
of each other. . . . [But] that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the 
same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental 
principles of a free constitution are subverted. . . . This, however, is not among the vices of 
that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of 
himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in 
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Constitution did not maintain a strict one-to-one pairing of 
institutions with types of power was common ground between the 
Constitution’s defenders and its detractors. What they disputed 
was whether the mixture was vice or virtue. And if the 
Constitution vests Congress with nonlegislative powers, then it 
cannot be true that Congress’s only powers are the “legislative 
powers herein granted.” 
To be sure, someone willing to read “all” to mean “only” 
could argue that the Vesting Clause limits Congress to the 
legislative powers herein granted where the exercise of legislative 
power is concerned. In other words, even if Congress can exercise 
some legislative powers and also some nonlegislative ones, it 
might be the case that the legislative powers Congress can exercise 
are only the ones “herein granted.” Again, this position would 
require reading the Clause as if it said “only” rather than “all.” 
But perhaps as great a problem for someone tempted by this 
argument is that it abandons the proposition that Congress is 
limited to a set of textually enumerated powers. If the Vesting 
Clause limits only the subset of congressional powers deemed 
“legislative,” then Congress can exercise powers beyond those 
“herein granted” so long as those powers are denominated 
executive, judicial, or anything else other than legislative, whether 
on prevailing modern conceptions or within the eighteenth-
century schemes the Founders knew. A lot of power lies down 
that road, including a lot of power going beyond anything 
specified in the text of the Constitution. So if the ultimate aim is 
to support the view that Congress can exercise only a set of 
textually enumerated powers, this refinement will be of no help. 
A different response in defense of the enumerationist 
reading might maintain that, although the Constitution blends 
forms of power within particular institutions, no part of the mix-
and-match arrangement vests a nonlegislative power in Congress. 
One critical element of this rejoinder is a distinction between 
powers vested in Congress and powers vested in the Senate or in 
the House of Representatives. On this view, the power to confirm 
appointments is a power of the Senate,58 not a power of Congress 
as a whole. Similarly, the text of the Constitution does not say that 
“Congress” has the power to impeach and remove government 
 
person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it.”). 
 58. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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officers. It says that the House of Representatives has the power 
of impeachment59 and that the Senate has the power to try 
impeachments.60 The House alone is not “Congress,” and neither 
is the Senate. So if impeachment and trial are two separate 
powers, one vested in the House and one in the Senate, then it is 
plausible to say that neither of these nonlegislative powers is 
vested in Congress as such. 
How persuasive this rejoinder seems is partly a matter of 
one’s relative tastes for formal and substantive reasoning. 
Substantively, nothing that either House does in an impeachment 
process has legal consequences without the action of the other, 
such that the power to remove an officer is held only by the two 
branches acting together—that is, by Congress. Formally, 
however, the text of the Constitution speaks of impeachment and 
trial as two powers vested in two separate bodies, neither of which 
is “Congress.” Indeed, someone inclined to read the Constitution 
as vesting only legislative powers in Congress might argue that the 
vesting of these three nonlegislative powers (confirmation, 
impeachment, and trial) in one House or the other rather than in 
Congress as a whole testifies to the Constitution’s general 
commitment to restrict Congress as such to a single sort of power: 
the legislative sort. 
I am not aware that anyone at the Founding offered the 
distinction between Congress and its separate chambers in order 
to establish that the Constitution vested no nonlegislative powers 
in Congress. But for modern readers motivated to defend that 
position, the distinction may be cogent enough to be serviceable 
even if nobody at the Founding thought in those terms. Moreover, 
readers motivated to defend that position are also likely, and in 
good faith, to be able to solve other problems that distinguishing 
between Congress and its component Houses might seem to 
threaten. For example, the power to originate bills for raising 
revenue is vested in the House of Representatives alone.61 So if 
the idea that Congress possesses only “legislative powers” 
requires the premise that a power vested in one House is not a 
power vested in Congress, and if it is also the case (as the plain 
 
 59. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole 
Power of Impeachment.”). 
 60. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments.”). 
 61. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
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text of Article I, Section 1 provides) that all legislative powers are 
vested in Congress, then it must be the case that the power to 
originate bills is not a legislative power. Absent the stakes of this 
interpretive question, that proposition might be a tough sell. But 
if one finds it appealing (or imperative) to conclude that Congress 
exercises only legislative powers, and one recognizes that 
defending that conclusion requires classifying the power to 
originate revenue bills as nonlegislative, it will not be difficult to 
come up (in good faith) with arguments characterizing the power 
to originate bills as nonlegislative. For example, one might argue 
that “legislative power” is exercised only when a bill is approved 
and not at any earlier point in the process. 
But that possibility raises this further puzzle: approved by 
whom? Presumably the answer is “approved by the body with the 
power to make the bill a law.” That answer need not imply that 
Presidents exercise legislative power when signing bills, because 
congressional approval is sufficient to make a bill a law even if the 
President does nothing.62 But it does seem to indicate that 
Congress does not exercise legislative power when, acting under 
Article V, it votes to propose constitutional amendments, because 
proposed amendments do not have the force of law until ratified 
by state legislatures. The problem, then, is that if the origination 
of a bill by the House is not legislative because it is insufficient to 
give the bill the force of law, the proposal of an amendment is also 
not legislative. And the proposal of amendments is a power vested 
in Congress as such.63 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the contention that 
the Constitution vests no nonlegislative powers in Congress is 
 
 62. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3. 
 63. One could also deny that the authority to originate bills for raising revenue and 
the authority to propose constitutional amendments to the states are legislative powers on 
the grounds that they are not “powers” at all, because the Constitution does not use that 
word when describing those processes. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue 
shall originate in the House of Representatives[.]”); id. art. V (“The Congress, whenever 
two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this 
Constitution . . . which . . . shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this 
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States[.]”). 
One’s sense of the strength of that argument may depend on one’s taste for formal as 
opposed to substantive reasoning. But if one accepts this argument, it would seem to follow 
that even if Congress were limited to “powers herein granted,” that limitation would not 
prevent Congress from possessing the capacity to do many things not lying within those 
powers, so long as those capacities were not called “powers.” The enumerationist reading 
aims at something more substantively constraining than that. 
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partly enabled by the fact that the categories “legislative,” 
“executive,” and “judicial” are malleable.64 Consider again 
Congress’s power to call conventions for proposing constitutional 
amendments on the application of the state legislatures.65 If we 
are disposed to think of all congressional action as “legislative,” it 
will not be hard to think of Congress’s calling such a convention 
as a legislative action. Calling a convention is prospective, and it 
has a policymaking aspect, and it would likely create rules for 
many people to follow, perhaps by determining the process for 
selecting delegates or the convention’s rules of procedure. But it 
is also easy to see calling such a convention as an executive action. 
It is the states and not Congress who possess the authority to 
make the substantive decision about whether to hold a 
convention.66 Congress’s role is limited to putting that choice into 
practice. To be sure, Congress in calling such a convention could 
exercise considerable discretion, for example, in setting the time 
and place of the convention and perhaps in crafting its rules of 
procedure or even providing for the method by which delegates 
would be chosen. Through those decisions, Congress could 
exercise substantive influence on the convention it was calling. 
But such discretion and influence are common in many activities 
that the American system routinely considers “executive.”67 So if 
we see the Constitution as containing a fair amount of mixing and 
matching with respect to powers and branches, as many in the 
 
 64. As are other categories that might be deployed to describe kinds of governmental 
power. For example, Americans who followed Locke’s analysis would have deemed 
several congressional powers “federative” rather than “legislative.” See JOHN LOCKE, 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, §§ 146–48, at 76–77 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1980) 
(1690). According to one recent Supreme Court opinion, Locke’s approach to the 
separation of powers was particularly influential among the Founders. See Gundy v. 
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133–34 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). If so, and if as a 
result the Founders would have understood several congressional powers as “federative” 
rather than legislative, then at least those Founders would have been unlikely to think that 
Congress was limited to “legislative powers herein granted.” There is good reason to think, 
however, that Locke’s view of the separation of powers was not influential in the American 
Constitution-making process. See, e.g., 1 THE RECEPTION OF LOCKE’S POLITICS, at l–liii 
(Mark Goldie ed., 1999); John Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the 
Eighteenth Century, in JOHN LOCKE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 45, 45–80 (John W. 
Yolton ed., 1969). 
 65. See U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures 
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments[.]”). 
 66. See id. (“The Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of 
the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments[.]”) (emphasis 
added). 
 67. Think of the discretion exercised by prosecutors, or by the President as 
Commander-in-Chief. 
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Founding generation did, then it is easy to see the power to call 
conventions on the application of state legislatures as executive. 
And if Congress is vested with an executive power, then the 
proposition that Congress is vested only with the “legislative 
powers herein granted” cannot be correct.68 
Perceptive observers have long understood that the 
classification of a given power as “legislative,” “executive,” or 
“judicial” is often contestable,69 and sometimes the wisest 
conclusion is that a given power does not fall inherently and 
exclusively into a single one of those categories.70 Different 
readers may thus have different intuitions about whether the 
Constitution’s blending of powers and branches undermines the 
enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting Clause. A 
reasonable person could conclude that the Constitution (on either 
a Founding-era reckoning or a modern one) does not clearly vest 
“executive,” “judicial,” or other “nonlegislative” powers in 
“Congress” as such. Alternatively, a reasonable person could 
conclude that the Constitution does that very thing, whether with 
respect to impeachment or appointments or calling conventions 
or otherwise.71 So in the end, the most responsible thing that can 
 
 68. One might resist the conclusion that the power to call conventions is an executive 
power vested in Congress by denying that Congress’s calling a convention is an exercise of 
a power at all: Article V says that Congress “shall call a convention,” not that Congress 
has the power to call a convention. Again, this move rests a great deal on terminology, and 
again it raises the problem that on its terms, even if Congress were limited to the “powers 
herein granted,” it might have untold abilities to do other things, so long as the capacity to 
do those things was called something other than “powers.” 
 69. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison). 
 70. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (reaching this 
conclusion with respect to the treaty power). 
 71. Based on his reading of Blackstone, William Winslow Crosskey concluded that 
as many as thirteen of the powers that Article I assigned to Congress were powers held by 
the King within the British constitutional system and would have been considered 
“executive” rather than legislative in nature. See 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, 
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 411–14 
(1953); see also MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (endorsing this position). These included 
the powers to coin money, to declare war, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, to raise 
and regulate fleets and armies, to naturalize foreigners, to be the “arbiter of commerce,” 
and to regulate weights and measures. See CROSSKEY, id. at 412–14. That view likely 
overstates the degree to which the Founders thought the Constitution assigned executive 
powers to Congress: Julian Mortenson cautions that, within the then-prevailing 
understanding of British constitutional law, powers could be formally vested in the King 
without being “executive powers” in any substantive sense. See Mortenson, supra note 15. 
It is not my purpose here to adjudicate this dispute. But I will point out, on Mortenson’s 
side of the question, that Americans in the 1780s who criticized the Constitution for vesting 
executive power in the legislative branch did not, so far as I am aware, point as examples 
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be said on this matter is conditional: if the category “legislative 
powers” does not exhaust the category “congressional powers,” it 
would make little sense to think that Article I opens with a 
declaration that a particular subset of legislative powers—that is, 
the “legislative powers herein granted”—were the only powers 
that Congress could exercise. Indeed, if the Founders generally 
understood the Constitution to vest both legislative and 
nonlegislative powers in Congress, then reading the Vesting 
Clause as if it said that Congress could exercise only the legislative 
powers herein granted would not just be to read the Clause to 
mean something that the language does not say. It would be to 
read the Clause to mean something that its language does not say 
in order to make the Clause say something that the Founders, or 
many of them, would have regarded as false. 
4. Original Usage: The Inference from Silence 
Another piece of Founding-era evidence is considerably less 
ambiguous. As far as can be determined, the enumerationist 
reading of the Vesting Clause was virtually unknown at the 
Founding. It was not, to be sure, completely unavailable. A great 
many people made a great many arguments about the 
Constitution in 1787–88, and, as in any sprawling conversation, a 
wide variety of ideas was on offer—some of them more tenable 
than others. But as far as I can tell, the surviving records reveal 
only two instances during the ratification period when anyone 
read Article I, Section 1 to mean that Congress could exercise 
only powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution’s text.72 
A delegate named Stephen Chambers read the clause that way at 
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,73 and so did the 
 
to most of the powers on Crosskey’s list of thirteen. It is also worth noting that any 
conclusion about how many non-executive powers the Constitution vested in Congress 
requires not just judgments about what counts as a nonlegislative power but also about 
what counts as “one power.” (How many powers are articulated in Article I, Section 8, 
clause 1?) For present purposes, however, nothing substantive depends on how many 
nonlegislative powers the Founders thought the Constitution assigned to Congress. All 
that matters is whether the Founders, or many of them, regarded Congress as exercising at 
least one power that was not “legislative” in nature. 
 72. This is my conclusion based on searching, inter alia, the DHRC database for the 
term “herein granted” on May 31, 2019, and subsequently asking a research assistant to try 
to falsify my conclusion using a variety of search strings. 
 73. The Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 444, 445 (Merrill Jensen ed., 
1976). Chambers, who was one of the original members of the Pennsylvania Society of the 
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pseudonymous writer Cassius in the Massachusetts Gazette.74 
Perhaps the argument was also made on other occasions: the 
documentary record is imperfect, and I could have missed some 
examples that the record does reflect. But regardless of whether 
the idea was articulated on just two occasions or also on four or 
five others, it would not have been more than marginal in the 
continental conversation. Apparently, the enumerationist reading 
was neither natural enough to be common nor persuasive enough 
on the few occasions when it was articulated for others to pick it 
up and make use of it. 
It is hard to know just why Americans at the Founding did 
not offer the enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause. But 
there is no shortage of possibilities, as the argument of this Article 
to this point suggests. Maybe they did not think that “herein 
granted” meant “granted in this document.” Or if they did think 
the powers referred to were specified in the document, maybe 
they took “herein granted” to mean “granted in Article I,” in 
which case the Clause was obviously not limiting, given the 
congressional powers specified in places like Article IV.75 Maybe 
they understood that no limit on “legislative powers” could be a 
limit on congressional power in general, because Congress had 
nonegislative powers as well as legislative ones. Maybe they just 
didn’t think that “all” meant “only.” But for whatever reasons, 
and in whatever combinations, it seems clear that Americans at 
the Founding did not understand the Vesting Clause in the way 
the enumerationist reading does. Which should probably not be 
surprising, given that reading’s several weaknesses. 
The enumerationist reading’s near-total absence from the 
 
Cincinnati, was an Irish-born lawyer who came to Pennsylvania before the Revolution. He 
died in 1789 as a result of a duel fought for apparently non-political reasons. See William 
Henry Egle, The Federal Constitution of 1787, 11 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY at 69, 69–
70 (1887). 
 74. Cassius VI, To the Inhabitants of this State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1787, 
reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 479, 482 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1998); Cassius VI, 
To the Inhabitants of this State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1787, supra, at 511, 511. Cassius 
was probably James Sullivan, a justice of the highest court in Massachusetts from 1776 to 
1782 and, in 1787, one of the lawyers who defended participants in Shays’s Rebellion, as 
well as Governor of Massachusetts from 1807 to 1808. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 30 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare 
J. Saladino eds., 1997); MAIER, supra note 48, at 193–94; CHARLES WARREN, 1 HISTORY 
OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 188 
(1908). 
 75. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (power to legislate for the territories). 
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ratification process is particularly noteworthy because issues 
about the extent of congressional power were central to the 
debate. The Constitution’s opponents repeatedly charged that 
Congress in the new system would be able to wield whatever 
power it wanted.76 The Constitution’s defenders denied the charge 
many times.77 If the very first words of Article I clearly stated that 
Congress had less than general legislative authority, why did the 
Constitution’s defenders not say so, loudly and often? Even if the 
first words of Article I were just a plausible suggestion of the 
point, rather than a clear statement of it, it would have been 
natural for the Constitution’s defenders to invoke it in these 
arguments. But they didn’t. In all of the Federalist Papers, for 
example, thirty or so of which specifically addressed questions 
about the extent of congressional power, Publius invoked the 
Vesting Clause exactly zero times. 
The evidence from the First Congress points in the same 
direction.78 Questions about enumerated powers were central to, 
and extensively debated in, both the removal debate of 178979 and 
the debate on the bill to establish the Bank of the United States 
in 1791.80 In the House of Representatives, each of those debates 
lasted for several days, with prominent Founders laying out their 
views about enumerated powers under the Constitution. On many 
occasions, it would have been useful for some of them (including 
Madison, both times) to be able to say that the text of the 
Constitution restricted Congress to the exercise of enumerated 
powers. In the removal debate, an argument that the Vesting 
Clause of Article I is limiting in a way that the Vesting Clause of 
Article II is not would have let Madison and his allies bolster their 
contention that the Constitution vested the President with 
executive power in general, rather than only with a specified list 
of powers.81 But the distinctive text of Article I’s Vesting Clause 
 
 76. See, e.g., Brutus I, To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y.J., Oct. 18, 1787, 
reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 411, 414 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); Centinel II, 
To the People of Pennsylvania, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, id. at 457, 460. 
 77. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 41, 45 (James Madison). 
 78. See generally JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1999). 
 79. See GIENAPP, supra note 42, at 125–63. 
 80. See id. at 202–47. 
 81. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 495–97 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement 
of Rep. Madison). The point can be further sharpened, because Madison in this debate 
actually did invoke the Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses as part of his argument that 
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played no role in the removal debate. So far as appears in the 
records, nobody mentioned it at all. 
The Bank debate is even more germane, because it focused 
above all else on questions about the extent of congressional 
power. Madison spoke repeatedly and at length, arguing not just 
that Congress could exercise only its enumerated powers but also 
that the principle of a limiting enumeration was fundamental to 
the system.82 He needed to argue these points, because not 
everyone agreed. Some of Madison’s opponents conceded that 
Congress could exercise only its enumerated powers and 
disagreed with Madison only on the question of whether the 
enumerated powers authorized the Bank, but others denied the 
basic premise that Congress could exercise only the powers that 
the Constitution specifically enumerated.83 If any significant 
number of members of the First Congress had thought that 
Article I, Section 1 decided this issue in Madison’s favor, 
someone—likely Madison—would have said so. But in the entire 
debate, at no point did Madison or anyone else arguing for the 
limitation of congressional power point to the language of the 
Vesting Clause. 
As far as I have been able to determine, the first prominent 
endorsement of the enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause 
came two years after the Bank debate. As noted in the 
Introduction to this Article, Hamilton in 1793 wrote a series of 
essays contending that President Washington had unilateral 
authority to proclaim America’s neutrality in the war between 
Britain and France. Writing under the pseudonym “Pacificus,” 
Hamilton developed several arguments. One was that issuing a 
neutrality proclamation was an “executive act” and that the 
Constitution vested the President with “the executive power”—
meaning, on Hamilton’s account, not just a set of specified powers 
(to command the army and navy, to receive ambassadors, etc.) but 
executive power in general.84 To support that claim, Hamilton 
 
the Constitution manifests an intention to minimize the extent to which power of any given 
kind (e.g., “legislative”) would be assigned to a branch not bearing the cognate description 
(e.g., “the legislature”). Id. at 497. So the Vesting Clauses were plainly in view—and yet 
neither Madison nor anyone else made use of the nonparallel phrasing of the Clauses, even 
though it would have helped them to do so. 
 82. See, e.g., Primus, “The Essential Characteristic,” supra note 14. 
 83. See, e.g., id. 
 84. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS 
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 33–43 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969). 
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contrasted the language of Article I’s Vesting Clause with that of 
Article II. The difference between “All legislative Powers herein 
granted shall be vested” and “The executive Power shall be 
vested,” Hamilton contended, reflected the difference between 
conferring a specific set of enumerated powers and conferring a 
type of power categorically.85 This was, of course, exactly the 
argument that would have helped Madison during the removal 
debate four years earlier. But Madison did not come up with it. 
And an argument that Madison could not come up with in 1789 is 
unlikely to have been a straightforward Founding-era 
understanding of the Constitution. 
Hamilton’s use of the Vesting Clause argument in his 
Pacificus essay is well known.86 For a modern audience, it likely 
masks the fact that the argument was all but unheard of before 
1793. When a lawyer knows that a constitutional interpretation 
that is widely credited today was made by Hamilton, it is easy to 
jump to the conclusion that it was a standard view at the 
Founding—or at least a view known and taken seriously. But as 
described above, the enumerationist reading of the Vesting 
Clause was all but unknown during the ratification debates and in 
the First Congress, despite the prominence during those times of 
debates about the extent of congressional power. Against that 
background, Hamilton’s articulation of the view in 1793 seems 
like innovative lawyering by an attorney for the executive branch. 
That doesn’t make it wrong. Reading creatively is part of 
what good lawyers do. For present purposes, though, the point is 
that Hamilton’s argument in 1793 required lawyerly creativity. He 
was not simply producing the straightforward meaning of the text 
in a way that his audience would recognize as familiar. Hamilton’s 
arguing for this reading in 1793 thus does not establish that the 
Framers or the ratifying public would have shared his view in 
1787–88, and they do not seem to have done so. Nor is there any 
indication that Hamilton himself had that view until the 
assignment to justify Washington’s proclamation motivated him 
to go looking for useful arguments. 
Just as the innovative nature of Hamilton’s argument doesn’t 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2101 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (invoking 
Hamilton’s Pacificus argument); Eric. A Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative 
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1675 n.26 (2002) (same). 
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make that argument wrong, it also doesn’t make that argument 
right. Of the many innovative arguments that creative lawyers 
make, something less than a hundred percent turn out to be 
sound. And when Hamilton did argue from an enumerationist 
interpretation of the Vesting Clause, it is not clear that he thought 
the matter all the way through. For example, Hamilton did not 
explain why a text that says “All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States” should mean 
“Only the legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States.” Or how a Constitution widely 
understood to mix types of power across the branches could also 
be a Constitution limiting Congress to legislative power alone. 
B. CONFIRMATION BIAS 
Hamilton’s failure to engage the problems with his reading 
might not have been the product of deliberate evasion. It is 
ordinary, in the process of creative lawyering, for an advocate to 
find a text that looks supportive at first glance and run with it, 
attending insufficiently to the weaknesses of his interpretation. 
When we want a text to mean something, we sometimes read it to 
mean that thing in perfectly good faith, even if a less motivated or 
more critical reader could give good reasons why the text should 
not be read that way. 
The popularity of the enumerationist view of Article I’s 
Vesting Clause among modern constitutional lawyers may be at 
least partly explained in similar terms. Just as we tend to misread 
texts to say what we want them to mean, we tend to misread texts 
to say what we expect them to mean.87 Almost every constitutional 
lawyer has a clear expectation that the Constitution will say that 
Congress can exercise only its enumerated powers. Every law 
student learns that principle. So there is a tendency to read the 
text of the Constitution as if it confirmed the point. And sure 
enough, two features of the Vesting Clause do correspond to 
features of the idea that Congress can exercise only specifically 
enumerated powers. First, the enumerated-powers idea indicates 
that Congress exercises specific powers, plural, rather than 
legislative power in general—and the Article I Vesting Clause, 
unlike its Article II and III counterparts, speaks of “powers” 
rather than “power.” Second, the enumerated-powers idea insists 
 
 87. See Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 91 (2010). 
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that Congress can do only things that are affirmatively specified 
in the Constitution, and the language of “herein granted” might 
reflect the idea of affirmative specification in the constitutional 
text. For a reader who is primed to think that the Constitution 
promulgates the enumeration principle, these features of the 
Vesting Clause’s text might be enough to confirm the 
presupposition. This is probably all the more so for readers who 
take the enumeration principle to be, conceptually, the first 
fundamental thing that one must know about the constitutional 
powers of Congress. After all, the Vesting Clause isn’t just some 
stray clause in Article I. It is the first thing the Constitution says 
about Congress. What more appropriate way could there be for 
the Constitution to begin its discussion of Congress than with a 
statement of the essential and distinctive characteristic of 
congressional power—that is, that it is confined to the powers 
specifically enumerated? 
The trouble with the thought process just described is that it 
gives in too easily to confirmation bias. The reader already 
believes that the Constitution permits Congress to authorize only 
its specifically enumerated powers. The reader expects an 
announcement of that principle when the subject of Congress is 
introduced. The first Clause describing Congress has some textual 
features that seem to distinguish Congress’s power from the 
President’s and the judiciary’s, and it has some words that 
resonate with the enumerated-powers idea. So the reader 
concludes that the enumerated-powers idea is what animates the 
language of the Clause. In so doing, the reader does not notice 
that that the plain meaning of the text says something else. And 
because the meaning the reader has attributed to the text is 
satisfying, the question of whether Americans in 1787–88 
understood (or could have understood) the text this way probably 
does not arise.88 It is assumed—much as most modern lawyers 
simply assume that the Founders understood “thirty-five years” 
to mean what we mean by the same phrase. Except that the 
assumption in the latter case is warranted. 
Nothing I have argued above means that the enumeration 
principle is wrong. Maybe that idea is correct, such that 
constitutional lawyers are fully justified in approaching their work 
on the understanding that Congress can exercise only its textually 
 
 88. “What satisfies the conscience lulls the mind.” Llewellyn, supra note 40, at 10. 
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specified powers.89 But even if that were the case, it would not 
follow that every clause of the Constitution should be read to 
establish or confirm that rule. The clause providing that Senators 
are elected every six years90 has no bearing on whether Congress 
is limited to a set of enumerated powers. Neither does the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV91 or the Debts 
Clause of Article VI.92 The point of the present analysis is that the 
Vesting Clause of Article I does not bear on the question either. 
That constitutional lawyers who expect the Constitution to 
establish the enumeration principle would find it established by 
the Vesting Clause is explicable, partly as a matter of 
confirmation bias. But whether or not the enumeration principle 
is a sound principle of constitutional law, the Vesting Clause does 
not establish it. 
C. THE ABSENCE OF ALTERNATIVES 
One other factor may help support the enumerationist 
reading of the Article I Vesting Clause: the absence of an 
alternative. Given the conventions of constitutional 
interpretation, the difference in syntax between the Vesting 
Clause of Article I and the Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III 
presents the conscientious interpreter with a question. Why is this 
Vesting Clause different from those other Vesting Clauses? Once 
the question is asked, the interpreter wants an answer. The 
enumerationist reading offers one. So, if the enumerationist 
answer is the only answer available, interpreters might gloss over 
its shortcomings. The only available answer is, by definition, the 
best available answer. 
But the enumerationist answer is not the only way to explain 
the distinctive syntax of Article I’s Vesting Clause. It is merely the 
most familiar. In the next two sections, I describe two other 
explanations, each of which is better than the enumerationist 
answer. The first alternative answer operates at the level of plain 
textual meaning: it makes sense of the difference in phrasing 
between Article I, Section 1 and the other two Vesting Clauses on 
a straightforward reading of the Constitution’s language. The 
second alternative answer operates at the level of drafting history. 
 
 89. Again, I have my doubts. See supra note 14. But that isn’t the point right now. 
 90. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 91. See id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 92. See id. art. VI, cl. 1. 
PRIMUS 35:3 12/29/2020  11:18 PM 
2020] HEREIN OF “HEREIN GRANTED” 331 
 
It suggests that the nonparallel wording of the three Vesting 
Clauses is a contingent artifact of the Constitution’s drafting 
process and reflects nothing substantive about congressional 
power. Different readers may have different intuitions about the 
relative attractiveness of these two explanations, but either one 
should be enough to displace the enumerationist reading. 
II. THE PLAIN-MEANING READING 
In this Part, I describe a different way to read Article I’s 
Vesting Clause. It is a plain-meaning reading—that is, a reading 
that gives the words of the Clause their ordinary-language senses. 
This way of reading the Clause has both strengths and 
weaknesses. In the end, I suspect that the attractiveness of this 
way of reading the Clause is partly a function of how committed 
one is to the proposition that the difference in phrasing between 
Article I’s Vesting Clause and that of the other two Vesting 
Clauses must reflect something substantive in constitutional law. 
For readers who are comfortable with the idea that the difference 
in phrasing among the Vesting Clauses might have no substantive 
significance, the plain-meaning reading (like the enumerationist 
reading) might seem less than compelling. But if the difference in 
phrasing must have substantive significance, then there is a strong 
case for adopting the plain-meaning reading—a stronger case, 
certainly, than the case for adopting the enumerationist reading. 
A. WHAT THE WORDS SAY 
Consider what the Vesting Clause would mean if its words 
were given their ordinary sense. On a plain-meaning approach, 
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States” means, well, that all legislative 
powers granted in the Constitution are vested in Congress. In 
other words, if the Constitution grants a legislative power, the 
body in which that power is vested is Congress.93 Not the 
President, not the courts, not the states, not the people directly. 
Just Congress.94 
 
 93. This formula works if “the Constitution” refers to a document, and it also works 
if “the Constitution” refers to a system. In the latter case, the passage means that all 
legislative powers granted by this system of government are vested in Congress. See supra 
notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 94. This plain-meaning reading does not establish a strong form of the nondelegation 
doctrine, because the fact that Congress is “vested” with a power need not mean that 
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This plain-meaning reading supplies a straightforward 
answer to the question of why Article I’s Vesting Clause differs in 
syntax from the other two Vesting Clauses. From a Founding-era 
perspective, if the Constitution vested all legislative power in a 
single branch of the national government, then it treated 
legislative power differently from executive power and judicial 
power. As noted above, it was common ground within the 
Founding generation that the national executive power was not 
vested entirely in the President, nor the national judicial power 
entirely in the courts. Examples included the House’s and 
Senate’s executive and judicial powers in the impeachment 
process95 and the Senate’s executive power in confirming 
appointments.96 In the First Congress’s first serious encounter 
with separation-of-powers issues—the removal debate of 1789—
Madison accordingly characterized the Vesting Clause of Article 
II as a default rule that is sometimes overcome by specific 
constitutional provisions varying the general pattern.97 In other 
words, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President” did 
not mean that all executive power would be vested in the 
 
Congress is disabled from delegating that power to another decisionmaker. See Thomas 
W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2097 (2004) (noting that the text of the Vesting Clause could 
reflect either the position that Congress may not delegate legislative power or the position 
that only Congress may delegate legislative power, and concluding overall that the latter 
position is superior); Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the 
Founding (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 658, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3512154 (adducing Founding-era support for the permissibility 
of Congress’s delegating the exercise of its powers to other actors, provided that Congress 
retained the authority to end the delegation and exercise the relevant power itself). In 
delegation cases, the Supreme Court has associated Section 1 with the nondelegation 
doctrine. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“Article I, 
§ 1, of the Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of 
the United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those powers[.]”). As Merrill’s 
argument indicates, that association might be incorrect—and indeed one can read the 
Supreme Court’s language in American Trucking as hedged on the point. “This text 
permits no delegation” is, strictly speaking, consistent with “nor does it prohibit 
delegation.” But whether or not Section 1 establishes a strong form of the nondelegation 
doctrine, reading its text as a limitation of certain legislative powers to Congress alone is 
more defensible, as a matter of plain meaning, than reading it as a limitation of Congress 
to a specific set of enumerated powers. 
 95. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463–64 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement 
of Rep. Madison) (describing the Senate’s power to try impeachments as judicial). 
 96. See, e.g., 1 DHRC, supra note 50 (characterizing the Senate’s power as 
executive); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 496 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. 
Madison) (same). 
 97. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 496 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. 
Madison). 
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President. It couldn’t mean that, because some executive power 
was not vested in the President.98 
On this understanding, the distinctive syntax of Article I’s 
Vesting Clause simply reflects the fact that legislative power, 
unlike executive and judicial power, was vested exclusively in a 
single branch of the national government. The Constitution could 
not say “All executive powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
President” or “All judicial powers herein granted shall be vested 
in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish,” because those 
propositions would have been false. Some executive powers were 
located outside the “executive branch,” and some judicial powers 
were located beyond the “judicial branch.” But legislative powers 
were not vested in any body other than Congress. So it was 
appropriate for Article I’s Vesting Clause to say that “All 
legislative powers herein granted” were vested in Congress. 
This plain-meaning interpretation makes sense of the fact 
that Article I’s Vesting Clause speaks of “All legislative powers” 
while the other Vesting Clauses speak of “The executive power” 
and “The judicial power.” But if the plain-meaning reading is to 
be an attractive alternative to the enumerationist reading of the 
Vesting Clause, it would benefit from also explaining something 
else: why Article I’s Vesting Clause contains the words “herein 
granted.” If the point of the Clause were to say that only Congress 
was vested with legislative powers, Article I could have opened 
with the words “All legislative powers shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States” rather than “All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” 
But it is not hard to imagine rationales for the choice to 
include the “herein granted” language that make sense within a 
plain-meaning reading of the clause. One possibility, 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 1792, is that the words 
“herein granted” reflected the view that the power of establishing 
(or disestablishing) the Constitution was itself legislative in 
 
 98. See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 487 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of 
Rep. Jackson) (explaining the President obviously does not have all of the executive power 
under the Constitution). Yes, this means that Justice Scalia was wrong in his rhetorically 
magnificent dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(insisting that the text of the Vesting Clause of Article II means that all executive power is 
vested in the President) (It is perhaps worth remembering that Justice Scalia’s dissent 
attracted only his own vote.). 
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nature.99 That power was not vested in Congress; it belonged to 
the people. So it would not be right to say, without qualification, 
that “All legislative powers shall be vested in Congress.” Another 
possibility is more practical: the statement “All legislative powers 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States” could have 
been read (or misread) to mean that the state legislatures were 
being stripped of their legislative powers. The drafters surely 
wanted neither to convey that idea nor to invite that misreading. 
Even if the Convention delegates had no intention of ending 
state-level legislation, they would not have wanted to propose a 
Constitution whose text would require them to explain that point. 
“All legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States” might accordingly have been a distinctly imprudent thing 
to write—especially at the very beginning of the Constitution. 
Understood in either of these ways, the “herein granted” 
language of the Vesting Clause does reflect a gap between the 
legislative powers vested in Congress and the complete universe 
of legislative power within the United States. On the first 
interpretation, it reflects awareness that Congress lacked the 
power to authorize or abrogate the Constitution. On the second, 
it reflects awareness that Congress would coexist with state 
legislatures. But neither of these interpretations points to the 
enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause. So long as the 
states continued to legislate, and Congress never presumed to 
abrogate the Constitution or establish another one, the limits 
requiring the Vesting Clause to include the “herein granted” 
language (rather than just saying “All legislative powers shall be 
vested in a Congress . . .”) would be respected even if Congress 
exercised some powers not affirmatively specified in the 
Constitution. 
In other words, neither of these explanations for the “herein 
granted” language suggests that the legislative powers “herein 
granted” are the sum total of congressional power. And as noted 
earlier, the status of legislative powers other than those “herein 
granted” is simply not specified by the text of Article I, Section 1. 
 
 99. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 n.* (1792) (“The people of the 
United States have vested in Congress all legislative powers granted in the constitution. 
They have vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress shall 
establish, ‘the judicial power of the United States.’ It is worthy of remark, that in Congress 
the whole legislative power of the United States is not vested. An important part of that 
power was exercised by the people themselves, when they ‘ordained and established the 
constitution.’” (quoting the circuit court of the district of Pennsylvania)). 
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Maybe Congress has such powers, and maybe it does not, but the 
Vesting Clause does not decide the issue. What the Vesting 
Clause says, on the plain-meaning interpretation, is that no one 
but Congress is vested with the legislative powers herein granted, 
not that Congress can exercise no powers but those. That is the 
straightforward meaning of “All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” 
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE PLAIN-MEANING READING 
The plain-meaning reading of the Vesting Clause makes 
considerably more textual sense than the enumerationist reading. 
But the plain-meaning reading can also be questioned, because its 
central contention—that nobody but Congress is vested with 
legislative powers granted by the Constitution—is open to 
dispute. For example, within the same Founding-era scheme that 
understood the Senate’s power to try impeachments as judicial 
and its power over appointments as executive, two powers vested 
in the President might be classified as legislative.100 They are the 
veto power,101 which as a practical matter makes the President the 
single most powerful person in the legislative process, and the 
power to make treaties.102 If the President exercises legislative 
power when doing those things, then it would not be true that the 
 
 100. At the New York ratifying convention, Hamilton described “legislative 
authority” under the Constitution as “lodged in three distinct branches properly 
balanced[.]” The New York Convention, in 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1921, 1953 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008). See 
also MAIER, supra note 48, at 151–52, 513 n.79. 
 101. Blackstone described the monarch under the British constitution as exercising a 
veto as “a constituent part of the supreme legislative power.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 253 (1769). Blackstone can also be read as 
describing the veto as executive. See id. at 242–43. It may be reasonable to construe 
Blackstone as taking the position that the veto is both of those things—which, to the extent 
that Blackstone’s scheme is informative as to prominent conceptions among the Founders, 
would be sufficient to make trouble for the proposition that only Congress can exercise 
legislative power. Whether under the influence of Blackstone or otherwise, Americans at 
the Founding did often describe the executive in the British government—that is, the 
monarch—as wielding legislative as well as executive power. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 47 (James Madison); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 553 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) 
(statement of Rep. Jackson) (saying that, in Britain, “the Executive authority is connected 
with, and forms a part of, the Legislative, and this upon Constitutional ground; it expands 
itself further, and within its capacious grasp actually holds the Legislative as well as 
Executive powers”). 
 102. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (writing that, in Britain, 
“The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has 
the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under 
certain limitations, the force of legislative acts.”). 
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Constitution vests legislative powers only in Congress. 
A defender of the plain-meaning interpretation could push 
back in several ways. For example, one might argue that “vesting” 
a power means authorizing a party to exercise that power 
completely, not authorizing that party to participate in the process 
in which the power is exercised. We do not say, this argument 
might run, that the power to lay taxes is vested in the House of 
Representatives, nor in the Senate. It is vested in Congress. On 
this view, the veto power vests no legislative power in the 
President. Veto power gives the President influence in the 
legislative process, but a veto never creates legislation, and 
nothing the President does can create legislation without the 
consent of Congress.103 In contrast, Congress—in which legislative 
powers are vested—can legislate without the President if he 
declines to act, or over his objection with sufficient 
supermajorities. By the same token, the treaty power would also 
not be “vested” in the President, because the President cannot 
conclude treaties alone. He needs the approval of the Senate. 
That solution to the treaty-power problem generates a new 
problem for the plain-meaning reading of the Vesting Clause: it 
prevents the treaty power from being vested in the President, but 
in a way that entails the conclusion that the treaty power is not 
vested in Congress either. A treaty, unlike a statute, is not 
something that Congress can create without the President’s 
participation. So if treaty-making is an exercise of legislative 
power, the choice to regard a power as “vested” in a 
decisionmaker only if that decisionmaker can exercise the power 
unilaterally would not be consistent with the proposition that 
Congress is vested with all legislative powers granted in the 
Constitution. 
But the defender of the plain-meaning interpretation has 
responses available. For example, one could push back on the 
characterization of treaty-making as legislative rather than 
executive. Both views were available at the Founding, as was the 
(probably more mature) view that it is neither entirely one thing 
 
 103. It is perhaps worthy of observation that when members of the Founding 
generation characterized the President as having legislative power because of his power 
within the legislative process, they discussed the power to veto bills rather than the power 
to approve them, even though it is the power to approve bills that is the power to make 
law. See, e.g., id. I will be grateful to readers who bring counterexamples to my attention. 
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nor entirely the other.104 Alternatively, a defender of the plain-
meaning interpretation might say that “herein granted” means 
“granted in Article I,” not “granted in the Constitution”—in 
which case treaty-making is irrelevant, because the treaty power 
appears in Article II, not in Article I.105 One might even deny that 
the treaty-making power is “granted” by the Constitution at all, 
on the theory that it was a power already enjoyed by the United 
States under the Articles of Confederation.106 
Reasonable people might have varying opinions about 
whether these responses successfully defend the plain-meaning 
interpretation of the Vesting Clause. My own sense is that the 
attractiveness of the plain-meaning interpretation, all things 
considered, is partly a function of how committed one is to the 
idea that the difference in syntax between Article I’s Vesting 
Clause and the other Vesting Clauses must reflect something 
substantive in constitutional law. If the difference in syntax must 
mean something, then the plain-meaning interpretation is 
defensible enough to adopt without much worry. It certainly 
seems more defensible than the enumerationist reading, both 
because it is more faithful to the Constitution’s words and because 
it is less at odds with Founding-era understandings of what powers 
were vested in Congress. 
III. THE DRAFTING-PROCESS READING 
A. THE LIMITS OF CLOSE READING 
There is also a third possibility. Perhaps the difference in 
syntax between the Vesting Clause of Article I and the Vesting 
Clauses of Articles II and III should not be read to reflect any 
substantive feature of constitutional law. The reasonable case for 
this view begins with the recognition that not every tic of language 
 
 104. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton). Whether the 
President’s power in the treaty-making process should be thought of as legislative, 
executive, or both might depend on a substantive question as well as a conceptual one: 
different people at the Founding may have had different visions of what the President (or 
his agents) would actually do during negotiations with foreign governments. The more one 
imagines the President (or his agents) making substantive decisions about what policies to 
promote or agree to in treaties, the more the function seems legislative. The more one 
imagines that the President (or his agents) conducting negotiations within specific policy 
constraints crafted by Congress, the more the function seems executive. 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 106. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX. 
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is significant, even in the Constitution. After all, the Constitution 
is a complex document, drafted by committees and worked over 
in an even larger group. Anyone who has had the experience of 
drafting documents under analogous conditions should know that 
the product, even when good, is unlikely to be tight and elegant in 
every respect. Even as applied to single-authored documents 
written by good writers, the assumption that every word choice is 
careful and significant, or that every clause is written with every 
other clause in mind, would often yield false inferences. When a 
document in question is written and edited by committee, those 
assumptions are even more misplaced.107 
Moreover, the drafters of the Constitution probably paid less 
attention to specific choices about wording than later interpreters 
of the work have.108 The practice of reading the text closely for 
implications and shades of meaning seems to have intensified 
during the disputations of the ratification process,109 with the 
result that the text was quickly (and has ever since been) subjected 
to more exacting analyses than it was consciously written to bear. 
To be sure, it does not follow that we should dismiss close reading 
as a modality of constitutional decisionmaking or as a tool for 
understanding the intent of the Framers. Where something seems 
irregular about enacted language, it makes sense for interpreters 
to try to figure out whether the irregularity signals something 
substantive (and if so, what in particular it signals). But sometimes 
the wisest conclusion, after due investigation, is that nothing 
substantive depends on a provision’s being worded one way 
rather than another. 
Notice that constitutional lawyers’ impulse to treat 
 
 107. The idea that the Constitution’s text can be interpreted on the assumption that 
every word is there for a reason and that the document’s text is something like a perfect 
system might be, in part, a product of a cultural tendency to venerate the Constitution as 
divinely inspired. After all, those interpretive conventions are common within some 
traditional approaches to the interpretation of a different sacred text—the Bible—and 
some habits of interpretation may carry over from one context to the other. See LEVINSON, 
supra note 39 (discussing relationships between biblical and constitutional interpretation). 
But whatever the merits of such interpretive approaches might be in the Biblical context, 
the Constitution should be understood to be sufficiently unlike the Bible so as to make 
those approaches unwarranted. For one thing, one of the background assumptions 
animating the idea that the Bible is properly interpreted as a perfectly spare and elegant 
document is that the author of the document is perfect and omniscient. Whether it follows 
that trying to read the Constitution similarly is merely misguided or also idolatrous is a 
question that different people will answer differently. 
 108. GIENAPP, supra note 42. 
 109. Id. at 87–104. 
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differences in phrasing as significant is selective. There are textual 
anomalies in the Constitution that we glide right by. One of them 
is even present in the specific context of the three Vesting Clauses. 
Twenty-first century constitutional lawyers make much of the fact 
that the phrasing of the Article I Vesting Clause differs from that 
of the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses—but the Vesting 
Clauses of Articles II and III are not fully parallel to each other 
either, and nobody seems to care. Article II begins “The executive 
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”110 In 
contrast, Article III begins “The judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court. . . .”111 Why is the 
judicial power but not the executive power described as a power 
“of the United States”? This is not a question that constitutional 
lawyers worry about, and reasonably not. The difference between 
the first Clauses of Articles II and III and the first Clause of 
Article I might be no more significant. 
At the time of the Founding—more specifically, from the 
time that the constitutional text was drafted until Hamilton’s first 
Pacificus letter in 1793—it seems that the difference in phrasing 
between Article I’s Vesting Clause and the Vesting Clauses of 
Articles II and III was one that readers passed over with as little 
thought as is now given to the nonparallel phrasing of the latter 
two Vesting Clauses. Not only is there virtually no evidence that 
readers considered the distinctive phrasing of Article I’s Vesting 
Clause significant, but there are several recorded instances of 
well-informed readers speaking affirmatively as if the three 
Vesting Clauses were fully parallel. In the removal debate, for 
example, Richard Bland Lee is recorded as saying that the 
Constitution creates “three principal branches, with express 
declarations, that all Legislative power shall vest in one, all 
Executive in another, and the whole Judicial in a third.”112 It is 
common, of course, for even generally competent readers to 
describe a proposition as “express” in the Constitution even when 
 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 111. Id. art. III, § 1. 
 112. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 525 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. R.B. 
Lee). Lee was, of course, a member of Virginia’s Lee dynasty: he was the cousin of Richard 
Henry Lee, the brother of General Henry (“Light-Horse Harry”) Lee and General (later 
Attorney General) Charles Lee, and the uncle of Robert E. Lee. See generally PETER 
STONE & SHERMAN EDWARDS, The Lees of Old Virginia, in 1776: A MUSICAL PLAY 10, 
10–19 (1976) (1969). In the House of Representatives, Lee represented the portion of 
Virginia that included Mount Vernon, which made President Washington his constituent. 
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the words of the Constitution do not state that proposition.113 But 
they generally do so when the meaning they attribute to the 
Constitution is well within prevailing expectations about what the 
Constitution directs. If the Founders generally thought that 
Article I’s Vesting Clause was worded differently from the other 
two Vesting Clauses so as to make the point that Congress was 
vested with less than all legislative power, Members of Congress 
probably would not have asserted that “all Legislative power” was 
vested in Congress just as all executive power is vested in the 
President—let alone that the arrangement was directed by 
“express declarations.”114 Similarly, and again in the removal 
debate, Alexander White argued that deeming the President to 
enjoy all executive power that the Constitution did not specifically 
except would also mean that Congress enjoyed all legislative 
power that the Constitution did not specifically except.115 No 
properly socialized modern constitutional lawyer would make this 
statement, because the modern lawyer knows to read the 
difference in the two Vesting Clauses to mean that Congress and 
the President are different in just this way. In 1789, that 
proposition was not apparent. 
B. MAKING THE SAUSAGE 
Attention to the Constitution’s drafting history suggests that 
the nonparallel phrasing of the three Vesting Clauses may have 
come about for reasons having nothing to do with distinctive 
limits on congressional power.116 The Convention’s first draft of a 
 
 113. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 6, describing the enumerationist reading of Article I, 
Section 1 as “explicitly clear.” 
 114. The Annals of Congress are not a stenographic transcript of the proceedings, so 
one cannot be certain that the words as they appear in that source were exactly the words 
spoken on the floor of Congress. But if Lee did not actually use these words, this passage 
from the Annals would still suggest that asserting that the Constitution “expressly” vested 
“all Legislative power” in Congress was not a sufficiently bizarre statement so as to prevent 
the compilers of the Annals from rendering Lee’s speech that way (If the notes from which 
the Annals were compiled seemed to indicate that Lee had said that Congress had three 
branches rather than two, the compilers might have paused to make sure they hadn’t 
garbled Lee’s remarks.). 
 115. See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 513–14 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement 
of Rep. White) (arguing that the relationship between Congress and the legislative power 
is the same as the relationship between the President and the executive power). In the first 
two Congresses, White represented a portion of western Virginia that now lies within the 
state of West Virginia. He subsequently served, at President Washington’s appointment, 
as one of the three commissioners on the board charged with planning the nation’s new 
capital city in the District of Columbia. 
 116. The account that follows is partly inspired by material discussed in John Mikhail, 
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full proposed Constitution was presented by the Committee of 
Detail on August 6, 1787.117 Article I of that draft, in its entirety, 
said that “The stile of the [] Government shall be, ‘The United 
States of America.’”118 Article II, also in its entirety, declared that 
“The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers.”119 Article III then turned to the discussion 
of specific institutional arrangements, beginning with the words 
“The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress[.]”120 There 
was no mention of powers “herein granted.” Congress’s Vesting 
Clause was, in that respect, perfectly parallel to the subsequent 
vesting clauses for the President (“The Executive Power of the 
United States shall be vested in a single person.”)121 and the courts 
(“The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall . . . be 
constituted by the Legislature of the United States.”).122 
This draft lay before the Convention from August 6 to 
September 12. Most of the Convention’s discussions of specific 
congressional powers took place during that time.123 While those 
discussions occurred, nothing in the proposed constitutional text 
suggested that Congress was getting a smaller share of “the 
legislative power” than the other branches were getting of “the 
executive power” and “the judicial power.” So far as appears from 
the surviving records, no one objected to the parallel 
formulations. No one suggested that the legislative Vesting 
Clause needed to be changed to say that Congress had only the 
powers “herein granted,” nor that it should be changed in any 
other way that would reflect a choice to limit Congress to the 
subsequently specified powers only. 
In September, the Committee of Style turned the August 6 
draft into something close to the constitutional text that was 
ultimately adopted.124 Among other changes, it eliminated the 
 
The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1100, 1104 (2014). 
 117. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 177 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 185. 
 122. Id. at 186. 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 303–13, 321–24, 337–39, 354–64, 447–56, 497, 508–10. 
 124. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener: 
Gouverneur Morris and the Creation of the Federalist Constitution, 119 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (describing the work of the Committee of Style). 
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prior draft’s first two Articles.125 Article III thus became Article I 
by default. But Article III had not been written to be the 
document’s opening article. It had been written to follow the two 
introductory articles that were now gone—the ones declaring that 
“The stile of the Government shall be, ‘The United States of 
America’” and that “The Government shall consist of the 
supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers.” Without 
those two articles, the first words of what would now be Article 
I—“The legislative power”—would have no antecedent 
reference. The Committee of Detail’s draft flowed: Article I 
introduced the government, Article II stated that that 
government would have a legislative power, and Article III 
explained where that legislative power would be vested. To 
instead jump right in with a sentence about some heretofore 
unmentioned thing called “the legislative power” may have 
seemed awkward. Changing the language to read “All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested . . .” might have been 
nothing more than the draftsman’s solution to that problem: it let 
the new Article I begin with a more introductory flavor. If so, and 
given that virtually nobody in the ratification debates or the First 
Congress treated the Vesting Clause’s distinctive wording as 
significant, it seems reasonable to think that the Clause’s syntax is 
better explained as an artifact of the drafting process than as the 
reflection of some substantive commitment about the limited 
power of Congress. 
If that origin story is reasonably accurate—and I do not claim 
to have done more than make it plausible—then it would be 
reasonable to understand the Vesting Clauses in either of two 
 
 125. One can speculate about why those Articles were eliminated. One possibility is 
that they were simply casualties of the Committee of Style’s larger decision to reduce the 
number of Articles. The draft produced by the Committee of Detail had twenty-three 
articles; the Committee of Style returned a slightly shorter document with only seven. 
Substantively, perhaps the Committee thought that the first two Articles of the prior draft 
were too provocative when read in comparison with the first two Articles of the Articles 
of Confederation. The first Article of the Articles of Confederation read “The Stile of this 
Confederacy shall be ‘The United States of America.’” Article I in the Committee of 
Detail’s draft changed “Confederacy” to “Government,” thus suggesting rather plainly 
that the new arrangement was more than “confederated.” Article II in the Articles of 
Confederation read “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and 
every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated 
to the United States, in Congress assembled.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, 
art. II. Replacing that language with “The Government shall consist of the supreme 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers” would have been a pretty bold statement. But 
this possibility is speculative: existing records do not explain the choice. 
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ways. First, they might be best understood not as operative 
provisions whose texts are finely crafted to allocate power in 
distinctive ways but as topic sentences for the first three Articles. 
On this reading, Article I, Section I just means “Now we’re going 
to talk about Congress, which is generally in the legislation 
business,” and the first sections of Articles II and III mean the 
same thing, mutatis mutandis, for the President and the courts. 
Alternatively, the Vesting Clauses might do a bit more than 
introduce the branches: they might introduce the branches and 
say, substantively, that each branch is the normal or default 
exerciser of a certain kind of power. But on either reading, it is a 
mistake to think that the difference in syntax between Article I 
and the other Articles means that anything distinctive is 
happening in Article I. 
CONCLUSION 
Within the practice of American constitutional law, it is 
perfectly normal to read clauses to mean things that the drafters 
and ratifiers would not have expected.126 But the recognition that 
the Convention probably did not mean to signal anything 
substantive by writing “All legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested . . .” rather than “The legislative power shall be 
vested . . .” might make it easier for constitutional lawyers to 
question the claim that the wording directs us to take a particular 
attitude toward the limits of congressional power. When one also 
recognizes that the words of the Clause do not say that Congress 
is vested only with the legislative powers herein granted, the case 
for the enumerationist reading of the Clause becomes quite thin. 
At most, it is an idea hung on a clause, rather than an idea that 
fidelity to the text requires. 
Reading closely is an important part of legal interpretation. 
It is appropriate for constitutional decisionmakers to notice that 
the wording of Article I’s Vesting Clause is not parallel to that of 
the other Vesting Clauses and to ask whether something 
substantive follows. Indeed, it is more than appropriate; it is an 
exercise of basic competence in constitutional interpretation. But 
 
 126. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“The Federal 
Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the 
Framers . . . . Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution 
were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal 
Government’s role.”). 
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if one has tried to attribute significance to the difference between 
two texts and come up only with unsatisfying possibilities, it may 
be wise to conclude that the textual difference should not make a 
substantive difference in law. 
The enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause reads “all” 
to mean “only,” blinks at the possibility that the Constitution gave 
Congress powers beyond the “legislative powers herein granted” 
because it gave Congress powers that are not legislative at all, and 
attributes to the clause a meaning that nobody in the ratification 
debates or the First Congress seemed to find there, despite ample 
opportunity and incentive to do so. The plain-meaning reading is 
better: readers who would like to attribute substantive 
significance to the Clause’s distinctive syntax could reasonably 
adopt it. But in the end, the best interpretation of Article I, 
Section 1 might not try to find meaning at the level of reading 
word by word. The wording may be a happenstance of drafting, 
and the sense of the Clause might simply be “Now we’re going to 
talk about Congress, which is, more or less, a legislature.” On 
either that conception or the plain-meaning reading, the Vesting 
Clause does not support the claim that Congress may exercise 
only the powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution. That 
so many leading constitutional lawyers have thought otherwise, 
even to the point of thinking the proposition “explicitly clear,”127 
is a testament to the power that orthodox thinking about 




 127. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 75. 
